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DON’T BRING A CAD FILE TO A GUN FIGHT: A 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO THE LEGAL 
AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING 
ITAR ON THE INTERNET 
Catherine Tremble* 
INTRODUCTION 
“[I]nformation should be free,”1 or rather, information will be free if 
someone wants it to be.  That someone is Cody Wilson.  Wilson was listed 
as one of Wired’s fifteen most dangerous people in 2012 not because he co-
opted a decades-old freedom-of-information mantra,2 but because the 
information he wants free enables the creation of 3D-printed guns.  Wilson 
is dangerous because he wants to live in a world where every citizen can print 
a gun, and because he started an organization to realize that vision.  He is 
dangerous not only because his vision is attainable, but because it might be 
inevitable. 
The U.S. government, using trade regulations from the 1970s, attempted 
to forestall Wilson’s idea for the future by restricting the information he 
shares, but the application of those regulations is uncertain in light of the First 
Amendment argument that their enforcement constitutes a prior restraint on 
Wilson’s speech.3  The U.S. government ultimately settled with Wilson in 
2018, and, even though some state attorneys general continue to fight his 
 
*  J.D., 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Williams College. This Essay 
benefited immensely from those willing to share their impressions and ideas with me on this 
topic, namely Professor N. Cameron Russell and many editors and members of Volume 86 of 
the Fordham Law Review.  Thank you to the Fordham Law Review Online editors, Praatika 
Prasad and Sara Dennis for their efforts to help this piece become a reality. 
 
 1. Alan Feuer, Cody Wilson, Who Posted Gun Instructions Online, Sues State 
Department, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/us/cody-
wilson-who-posted-gun-instructions-online-sues-state-department.html 
[https://perma.cc/X7YM-YCMG] (quoting Cody Wilson). 
 2. See The Staff of Danger Room, The 15 Most Dangerous People in the World, WIRED 
(Dec. 19, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/12/most-dangerous-people/ 
[https://perma.cc/ASP9-2HE2] [hereinafter Danger Room]; see also Janus Kopfstein, Guns 
Want To Be Free: What Happens When 3D Printing and Crypto-Anarchy Collide?, VERGE 
(Apr. 12, 2013, 09:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2013/4/12/4209364/guns-want-to-be-
free-what-happens-when-3d-printing-and-crypto-anarchy [https://perma.cc/JB53-2V9C] 
(noting that “Stewart Brand’s famous notion that ‘information wants to be free’ has been an 
almost ubiquitous refrain” since the 1980s). 
 3. See Feuer, supra note 1. 
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ability to post files containing blueprints for 3D-printed guns,4 those efforts 
are likely to result in the same unsuccessful end.5 
This Essay begins by outlining Wilson’s motivation to found his 
organization, Defense Distributed, and the organization’s progress toward its 
goals.  Then, Part II provides a brief overview of the protracted legal battle 
between Wilson and the State Department over the right to publish 
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) files on the internet that enable the 3D 
printing of guns and lower receivers.  Part III.A takes a brief look at whether 
these CAD files are rightly considered speech at all and, if so, what level of 
protection they might receive.  Part III.B then addresses the problem of even 
asking whether the files are speech subject to regulation.  Part III.B also 
highlights the similarities between regulating internet speech and regulating 
public-order crimes, focusing on the impact that enforcement problems in 
both areas can have on government credibility.  It ultimately questions 
whether these legal battles provide any utility to society. 
In Part IV, this Essay argues that the State Department is utilizing old and 
incongruent regulations to enforce practically unenforceable laws to little or 
no effect, ultimately hurting the credibility of the State and martyring people 
like Wilson.  This Essay advocates for a solution that focuses on 3D printer 
manufacturers as a control point for gun manufacturing.  This solution avoids 
First Amendment issues and makes import and export control a physical 
reality, rather than an unbounded problem relegated to an open internet.  This 
Essay looks beyond a judicial solution to practical solutions that stem the 
growth of in-house manufacturing of weapons. 
I. AN ANARCHIST’S UTOPIA: CODY WILSON’S DREAM (AND THE 
REALITY) OF DISTRIBUTING DEFENSE ARTICLES 
Cody Wilson, a self-described crypto-anarchist, is the founder of Defense 
Distributed, a non-profit organization created to “‘promot[e] popular access 
to arms guaranteed by the United States Constitution’ by ‘facilitating global 
access to, and the collaborative production of, information and knowledge 
related to the 3D printing of arms; and by publishing . . . such information . . . 
on the Internet at no cost to the public.’”6  The non-profit exists for the 
specific purpose of disseminating CAD files that contain instructions for 
printing guns and gun parts, which are readable by 3D printers. 
Wilson’s personal mission moves beyond Second Amendment rights into 
theories of breaking down governmental monopolization of force and 
fighting surveillance tactics.7  His “whole goal in starting this company” is 
 
 4. Emily Dreyfus, 3-D Printed Gun Blueprints Are Back, and Only New Laws Can Stop 
Them, WIRED (Aug. 29, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/3-d-printed-gun-
blueprints-return-laws-injunction/ [https://perma.cc/8K4X-NUUX]. 
 5. See id. (“[B]ecause the case against the blueprints has always hinged on export law, 
Wilson could have sold them legally within the United States all along” so long as he verified 
the file was being downloaded by U.S. citizens). 
 6. Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 7. Andy Greenberg, 3D-Printed Gun’s Blueprints Downloaded 100,000 Times in Two 
Days (With Some Help From Kim Dotcom), FORBES (May 8, 2013, 5:12 PM), 
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to demonstrate “the pathway to defeating a certain idea of technical control,”8 
and show that any free citizen can create technology and share it with the 
commons without the interference of the State or any corporate entity.9  The 
goals of both the man and the organization can be reduced to one driving 
force: the political motivation to take some power from the government.  
Understandably, it is a goal that the government, and much of society, has 
fought against since the founding of Wilson’s organization. 
Defense Distributed, founded in 2012, faced substantial pushback getting 
off the ground from both the internet and 3D printing communities.  Wilson’s 
initial funding campaign was kicked off of Indiegogo,10 and later his first 
rented printer was repossessed after the company who owned it got wind of 
his plans.11  But with the help of alternate funding sources (including Bitcoin 
donations) Wilson was able to provide CAD files to the public to print 
anything from the lower receivers of AR-15s (the only part of a gun 
technically considered a “firearm”) to a fully plastic weapon known as the 
“Liberator.”12  He also created a file-sharing platform so that other designers 
could share their CAD files with the public.13  Wilson’s files were 
downloaded all over the world and copies were posted on other file-sharing 
websites within days.  The CAD was out of the bag. 
II. THE STATE ENTERS THE FRAY: WILSON’S OFFENSIVE MOVE TO 
CONTINUE FILE-SHARING 
One thing Wilson did not anticipate while fulfilling his vision for the future 
was the government’s enforcement of the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR).  In May 2013, shortly after posting the CAD file for the 
Liberator, Wilson received a letter from the State Department requiring him 
to take down ten files pending evaluation by the State Department of whether 
they were defense articles required to comply with ITAR approval and 
 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/08/3d-printed-guns-blueprints-
downloaded-100000-times-in-two-days-with-some-help-from-kim-dotcom/#53ba669a10b8 
[https://perma.cc/A629-8U3Q] (“Call me crazy, but I see a world where contraband will pass 
underground through the data cables to be printed in our homes as the drones move 
overhead.”). 
 8. Cyrus Farivar, Does it Violate Federal Export Law if a Website Publishes CAD Files 
of Firearms?, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 22, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2016/02/does-it-violate-federal-export-law-if-a-website-publishes-cad-files-of-
firearms/ [https://perma.cc/ENE5-3YYH] (quoting Cody Wilson). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Fidel Martinez, Indiegogo Shuts Down Campaign to Develop World’s 
First Printable Gun, DAILY DOT (Aug. 27, 2012, 12:36 PM), https://www.dailydot.com/ 
news/indiegogo-3d-printed-gun-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/G7LC-AT8F]. 
 11. See Danger Room, supra note 2. 
 12. Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 13. See Kopfstein, supra note 2. 
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licensing.14  Noncompliance with ITAR may result in criminal fines and 
imprisonment.15 
ITAR is a set of rules promulgated by the State Department under the Arms 
Export Control Act.16  The Arms Export Control Act designates that the 
President shall “control the import and the export of defense articles” and 
those “defense articles” shall be designated by the President in the 
“Munitions List.”17  “Defense articles” expressly include “technical data . . . 
stored in any physical form” including “blueprints, drawings, photographs, 
plans, instructions or documentation” about “the design, development, 
production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance 
or modification of defense articles.”18  According to the State Department, 
the regulations required Wilson to be a licensed arms exporter in order to 
share his mockups on the internet, as the internet was undoubtedly a place in 
which files were going to be accessed abroad or “exported.”19  The 
regulations also required that no files be shared with foreign nationals located 
domestically or abroad.20 
Ultimately, “[b]ecause Defense Distributed didn’t seek an export license 
[before posting the files] there [was] a problem.”21  The letter directed 
Wilson to remove the files and to refrain from posting more while the 
Department reviewed whether he needed the license.22  But, because of the 
political nature of Wilson’s actions and unsettled case law surrounding 
ITAR, the “letter sparked First Amendment concerns” that this constituted a 
prior restraint on speech, as well as the criminalization of political speech.23  
Wilson stated that he had no desire to break the law and spent the next two 
years “fil[ing] paperwork in an effort to comply with the regulations.”24  
When the State Department withheld its decision past the designated review 
period, Wilson “came to believe he was being singled out for scrutiny.”25  
 
 14. Letter from Glen E. Smith, Chief, Enforcement Division, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Cody 
Wilson, Founder, Defense Distributed (May 8, 2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/ 
140471313/Letter-from-Department-of-State-to-Defense-Distributed 
[https://perma.cc/N9QF-M34M]. 
 15. Pub. L. No. 90-629, § 38, 82 Stat. 1320 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) 
(2012)). 
 16. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 454, 464 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(first quoting 22 C.F.R. § 120.6; then quoting 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1)). 
 19. Brief for Federal Appellees at 16–18, Def. Distributed, 838 F.3d 451 (No. 15-50759), 
2016 WL 614088, at *16–18. 
 20. See id. at 36 (citing 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(4)). 
 21. Ansel Halliburton, The Constitution and the 3D Printed Plastic Pistol, TECHCRUNCH 
(May 16, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/05/15/the-constitution-and-the-3d-printed-
plastic-pistol/ [https://perma.cc/XGL3-WR3F]. 
 22. See Feuer, supra note 1. 
 23. Julia Cosans, Between Firearm Regulation and Information Censorship: Analyzing 
First Amendment Concerns Facing the World’s First 3-D Printed Plastic Gun, 22 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 915, 918 (2014). 
 24. See Feuer, supra note 1. 
 25. Id. 
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“Worried that he was being thrust into a kind of legal limbo,” Wilson filed 
for a preliminary injunction in order to continue posting.26 
Wilson’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied in the district 
court.27  On appeal, that decision was upheld in the Fifth Circuit.28  Finally, 
Wilson’s application for certiorari on the issue of preliminary injunction was 
denied.  The district court denied the preliminary injunction, stating national 
security concerns outweighed free speech concerns.  It noted that a 
preliminary injunction was an extraordinary remedy, and that while the 
violation of First and Second Amendment rights is an irreparable harm, 
ultimately, “the State Department’s stated interest in preventing foreign 
nationals—including all manner of enemies of this country—from obtaining 
technical data on how to produce weapons and weapon parts is not merely 
tangentially related to national defense and national security; it lies squarely 
within that interest.”29  
The Fifth Circuit, in evaluating the district court’s balancing of the public 
interest in maintaining freedom of speech for private parties with the public 
interest in national security, recognized an especially prescient point, holding 
that 
[b]ecause those files would never go away, a preliminary injunction would 
function, in effect, as a permanent injunction as to all files released in the 
interim.  Thus, the national defense and national security interest would be 
harmed forever. The fact that national security might be permanently 
harmed while [Defense Distributed’s] constitutional rights might be 
temporarily harmed strongly supports our conclusion that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in weighing the balance in favor of national 
defense and national security.30 
This holding did not address the merits of the case, such as whether the 
files were in fact protected speech, what standard of scrutiny they deserved, 
and whether ITAR was constitutional as applied.  Those issues were 
remanded back to the lower court31 and left unresolved after a settlement was 
reached in 2018. 
III. ARE CAD FILES SPEECH AND DOES IT MATTER? 
Part III.A of this Essay explores the possible ruling on the free speech 
questions that, before settlement, were at issue on remand.  Part III.B outlines 
two reasons why the problems posed by 3D printing guns are likely 
unsuitable for judicial resolution.  Part III.B also highlights concerns about 
the logical construction and modern application of ITAR, as well as problems 
with its practical enforcement. 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680, 701 (W.D. Tex. 2015). 
 28. Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 638 (2018). 
 29. Id. at 456. 
 30. Id. at 460. 
 31. Id. at 461. 
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A. Are CAD Files Speech? 
The State Department’s letter constitutes the prior restraint of speech—
courts’ most hated form of censorship—only if the files that it seeks to silence 
are “speech.”  Furthermore, even if they are speech, the State Department’s 
licensing scheme and export restrictions may still stand under two 
circumstances.  First, if the CAD files (or the posting thereof) are considered 
“pure speech” and are evaluated under strict scrutiny, ITAR may be 
constitutional if a court determines it is sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest.32  Second, if the CAD files are 
considered expressive conduct, they will be evaluated under a more lenient 
First Amendment standard—intermediate scrutiny33—and it is more likely 
that the regulations are constitutional as applied. 
The strict scrutiny analysis is not one that the court is likely to spend time 
on, as the files are so demonstrably functional that they cannot feasibly be 
considered “pure speech.”34  The next area to evaluate is whether the CAD 
files constitute “expressive conduct,” which is also given First Amendment 
protection.  Where CAD files combine both “speech and non-speech 
elements yet still contain[] sufficient elements of communication, then the 
restriction can only survive intermediate scrutiny if it furthers a substantial 
government interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech.”35 
As to whether CAD files are both functional and expressive, a related case, 
Universal City Studios v. Corley,36 is illustrative.  In Corley, the court held 
that source code exhibits both functional and expressive attributes.  The court 
reasoned that “when executed by a computer, [code] carries out functions and 
performs tasks,” but “functionality does not necessarily preclude” the 
conveyance of information found in expressive activity, specifically noting 
that the source code was a type of written language that held expressive value 
to other coders.37 
Under this analysis, CAD files certainly are properly classified as 
functional for their “ability to instruct a printer to create a real, 3-d object 
from an online design.”38  But the issue of whether their source code is useful 
as expressive on its own is less clear.  It is likely that CAD files do not hold 
expressive value in their source code where that code is computer generated.  
However, the court will likely deem CAD files protectable under the First 
Amendment because these files are “expressive for [their] more traditional 
aspects of speech, the [files’] blueprint design.”39  In fact, the functionality 
 
 32. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 221 (1992) (finding this threshold was not 
met). 
 33. See Cosans, supra note 23, at 925 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968)). 
 34. See id. at 930 (citing Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 
2001) for the holding, narrowly, that computer code is speech). 
 35. See id. at 923. 
 36. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 37. See Cosans, supra note 23, at 927. 
 38. Id. at 930. 
 39. Id. 
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of the CAD file “depends on the existence of an expressive blueprint design 
and, therefore, the file contains sufficient elements of communication to 
classify the file as a type of speech that warrants a First Amendment 
analysis.”40  Considering that courts typically treat blueprints as “pure 
speech,” it is highly unlikely that the functional aspects of CAD files will rob 
them of First Amendment protection.41 
One argument that the expressive characterization of blueprints should not 
apply to the blueprints in CAD files is that this characterization was created 
on “the assumption that it is impossible to yield any functional result without 
the participation and interpretation of a live human being,” and that “modern 
technology does not necessitate the same level of human involvement in the 
comprehension of a blueprint, sometimes requiring as little as the single click 
of a mouse to achieve functional results.”42  But this argument fails where 
the CAD files only produce pieces of a larger object.  No firearm can be 
assembled without significant human engagement, thus reinvigorating the 
blueprint argument.  The characterization of the CAD file and the action of 
posting it as expressive conduct is bolstered by the fact that “the First 
Amendment does not require the articulation of a narrow and isolated 
message to classify expressive activities as speech, but instead it defines this 
type of speech by its general ability to convey ideas and information.”43 
In light of the above, courts will likely find CAD files deserve intermediate 
scrutiny because of their expressive and functional characteristics.  But, 
certain scholars posit that, even under intermediate scrutiny, CAD files are 
subject to ITAR regulations and the constitutional challenge will fail due to 
the significant interest in national security and the narrow scope of ITAR.44  
However, a judge considering the larger problems of ITAR outlined in Part 
III.B below, might be unwilling to overcome the remaining interpretive 
hurdles required to allow ITAR’s enforcement. 
B. Does It Matter?: The Problems with a Government Win or Draw 
The above analysis of whether CAD files constitute expressive conduct 
worthy of First Amendment protection begs the question: does the answer 
matter?  What does enforcement of such prior restraint look like in reality?  
This section explores how the battles to enforce ITAR tend to go unresolved, 
and then looks at what legal interpretations an actual government win under 
ITAR would require. It then asks whether, at the end of the day, those strained 
judicial interpretations are worth it where the enforcement of prior restraint 
may be minimally effective at controlling information. 
The issue of whether ITAR constitutes a prior restraint on speech has made 
its way through the courts in one other notable instance—albeit in a 
convoluted and still unresolved manner.  In Bernstein v. U.S. Department of 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 930–31. 
 42. Id. at 931. 
 43. Id. at 924. 
 44. See id. at 935. 
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State,45 Daniel Bernstein, a computer scientist doing research at University 
of California, Berkley, brought suit against the State Department in order to 
secure the right to publish his encryption code on the internet without facing 
criminal prosecution.  This code was considered a defense article included 
on the Munitions List.  The district court “found that it was unconstitutional 
for the government to prevent Bernstein from publishing his crypto 
software,” holding “that blocking Bernstein’s publication amounted to a prior 
restraint on his speech that violated the First Amendment.”46  The court 
further held that the ability to gather foreign intelligence in “furtherance of 
world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, are 
clearly insufficient [rationales to justify prior restraint] without more.”47 
This ruling was upheld in the Ninth Circuit, but because the government 
moved control of encryption code to the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Commerce, the case was decided as to commercial export regulations rather 
than ITAR.48  The opinion held that “because the prepublication licensing 
regime challenged here applies directly to scientific expression, vests 
boundless discretion in government officials, and lacks adequate procedural 
safeguards, it constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on speech.”49  
These issues exist under ITAR as well, but the government interest is more 
compelling. 
This opinion was withdrawn when the court granted a rehearing en banc.  
The en banc hearing never occurred, however, because the government 
introduced an interim rule that exempted “‘publicly available’ encryption 
source code from license requirements.”50  Bernstein amended his complaint 
to allege the new regulations still created a prior restraint, but the government 
moved for summary judgment, stating that Bernstein no longer had standing 
to bring suit because he now had the right to publish.  The district court 
granted that motion and the case was dismissed in 2003. 
The government avoided an outright loss on ITAR and prior restraint in 
the Ninth Circuit by moving the regulation of computer code to different 
administrative agencies and allowing certain exemptions that effectively 
lifted the prior restraint on Bernstein’s speech.  This was a learning 
opportunity for the State Department; it functioned as a tour of the pitfalls 
inherent in using ITAR to enforce prior restraints on speech—even where 
that speech is functional.  The speech issues are far from resolved.  Some 
scholars believed “Defense Distributed [would] likely follow Bernstein’s 
path,” that “[t]he State Department’s takedown demand probably qualifies as 
a prior restraint,” noting courts’ hostility to that type of restriction.51 
 
 45. 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 46. See Halliburton, supra note 21. 
 47. Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1288 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1)). 
 48. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 49. Id. at 1145. 
 50. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163, at *2 
n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004). 
 51. Halliburton, supra note 21. 
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Defense Distributed’s recent legal engagement with the State Department 
has puttered out in a similar manner.52  The government settled with the 
company on June 29, 2018.53  The settlement stated that the government 
would “change the export control rules surrounding any firearm below .50 
caliber—with a few exceptions like fully automatic weapons and rare gun 
designs that use caseless ammunition—and move their regulation to the 
Commerce Department, which won’t try to police technical data about the 
guns posted on the public internet.”54  The settlement also stated the 
government would pay $40,000 of Defense Distributed’s legal fees55 and 
gives it “a unique license to publish data about those weapons anywhere.”56 
On the most basic level, this victory for Defense Distributed perfectly 
demonstrates the additional difficulty of maintaining an action based on 
executive enforcement of regulations: political change.  As administrations 
change, lawsuits will continue to crop up and fade away—a poor model of 
enforcement for keeping information, of all things, under government 
control.57 
But even an outright win presents problems for the government.  To find 
ITAR constitutional, the court would need to perform some interpretive 
gymnastics that might hurt its credibility.  Namely, the court would need to 
interpret the term “public domain,” to not include the internet.58  “Under 
ITAR, something that is ‘public domain’ is merely something that is 
‘generally accessible or available to the public’”—but, because it was written 
in the 1970s, those places where “information can be ‘generally accessible’” 
were considered physical bookstores and libraries.59  That is no longer the 
case.  Further, the reality of a government win is unlikely to have much 
practical effect on the dissemination of this information, as even when 
Defense Distributed was prevented from sharing their files, the same files 
were hosted by other sites.60 
 
 52. Andy Greenberg, A Landmark Shift Opens Pandora’s Box for DIY Guns, WIRED (July 
10, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/a-landmark-legal-shift-opens-pandoras-
box-for-diy-guns/ [https://perma.cc/7VRC-4GXU] (noting that the State Department 
“essentially surrenders to [the blended First and Second Amendment] argument”). 
 53. Tiffany Hsu & Alana Feuer, ‘Downloadable Gun’ Clears a Legal Obstacle, and 
Activists Are Alarmed, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/07/13/business/downloadable-gun-allowed-alarming-activists.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q33U-STY7]. 
 54. Greenberg, supra note 52. 
 55. Hsu & Feuer, supra note 53. 
 56. Greenberg, supra note 52. 
 57. Hsu & Feuer, supra note 53 (“Some critics said it suggested close ties between the 
Trump administration and gun-ownership advocates, this week filing requests for documents 
that might explain why the government agreed to settle.”). 
 58. See Farivar, supra note 8. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Derek Mead, With 3D-Printed Gun Files Safely on the Pirate Bay, What’s Next?, 
MOTHERBOARD BLOG (May 10, 2013), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
z44de3/with-3d-printed-gun-files-safely-on-the-pirate-bay-whats-next-1 
[https://perma.cc/4RYQ-B42M]. 
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Even more bizarre, ITAR is violated if a foreign national sees the 
information.  Meaning that even if the file is shared within the United States, 
but a foreign national sees it, the law has been broken.  In its brief to the Fifth 
Circuit, the State noted that “the regulations at issue do not prohibit Defense 
Distributed from sharing technical data with fellow U.S. citizens on 
American soil,” suggesting this “be accomplished by verifying the 
citizenship status of those interested in the files, or by any other means 
adequate to ensure that the files are not disseminated to foreign nationals.”61  
This ignores the practical reality that those files will likely pass through 
servers in several countries before reaching their intended target.  While it is 
possible that the files may not be viewed by others, that cannot be guaranteed. 
Assuming that a court makes those interpretations and the holding permits 
the government to legally prohibit Defense Distributed from distributing 
CAD files: what effect flows from the ruling?  The files are in the open and 
anyone can download them.  The government will have won the legal battle, 
but will lose a public information war. 
Publicly-acknowledged unenforced laws are problematic.  Where law 
enforcement is made difficult by the hidden nature of crimes—such as 
gambling or drug use (so called “public-order” crimes)—the State’s 
enforcement authority is brought into question and unpunished illegal 
behaviors are normalized.  To call Wilson’s conduct criminal but to be unable 
to effectively stop what he put in motion makes the term “criminal” mean 
less,” and therefore makes it less powerful, eroding any deterrent or 
expressive value of a criminal sanction.”62  Where the State seeks to impose 
laws that are impossible to enforce effectively, it loses credibility as the 
enforcer of justice. 
Further, some scholars argue that legal process costs involved in arresting, 
processing, and incarcerating criminals whose guilt or innocence is never 
determined or effectively punished leads to large costs on the justice system 
with little benefit.  Here, where protracted legal battles result in settlements—
either as the result of political change or lack of belief in the ability to alter 
First Amendment law—legal process costs are high and the results are, at 
best, unsettled (with respect to Defense Distributed) and, at worst, 
nonexistent (with respect to the files shared on other platforms).  As such, 
judicial methods for resolving issues of information dissemination are both 
ineffective at maintaining faith in criminal justice and economically 
inefficient means by which to maintain order.63 
 
 61. Brief for Federal Appellees at 20, Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 
451 (5th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-50759), 2016 WL 614088, at *20. 
 62. Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 268, 277–78 (2015). 
 63. See id. at 269. 
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IV.  TAKING THE REGULATIONS OFFLINE: REGULATING 3D PRINTER 
MANUFACTURERS 
The internet presents many unique challenges, but the creation of guns via 
the quick and efficient means of 3D printing does not have to be an 
unresolvable one.  This Essay contends that regulation in this area should not 
begin by limiting the dissemination of “technical data” produced by citizens.  
There is evidence to suggest that the more secure people are with their 
government, the more information flows freely.64  A governmental 
crackdown that implicates controlling data flows at the expense of First and 
Second Amendment rights could be seen as embodying the insecurity of 
governing officials.  The point of Wilson’s endeavor was to show that the 
government cannot control the flow of information, and he has been proven 
right by downloads that still occur today.65 
Utilizing ITAR to prosecute people like Wilson—while tempting—will 
expose itself as a misguided effort when, time and time again, the information 
breaks free.  This is not a copyright scenario in which the owner seeks to 
protect the information; it is functional political speech, intended to be 
subversive.  While many consider the political philosophy of anarchism 
absurd, the point of the First Amendment is not to agree with the speech of 
others, but to allow others the freedom to speak. 
The main goals that current federal gun laws—such as the Undetectable 
Firearms Act,66 and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) regulations on manufacturing and licensing of guns67—
seek to attain are twofold: First, current law makes having undetectable 
firearms illegal;68 second, it makes the distribution and sale of lower 
receivers with no serial numbers illegal.69  To address these goals in the 3D 
printing sphere, Congress should look to the manufacturers of 3D printers to 
monitor and limit the potential manufacturing of physical guns.  This Essay 
proposes that instead of criminalizing the distribution or possession of CAD 
files, the government should work with the manufacturers of at-home 3D 
printers to create firmware that would recognize when the file being printed 
has the capability of becoming an undetectable weapon or a lower receiver. 
The approach would begin with the creation of firmware that prevents 
offline printers from printing shapes used in gun manufacture.  Thus, any 
printing of guns would require a printer to be online. 
 
 64. Cf. Roman Mars, The Giftschrank, 99 PERCENT INVISIBLE (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/the-giftschrank/ [https://perma.cc/YN2T-3C7X] 
(describing the German practice of keeping books deemed “subversive” away from the general 
public in locked rooms in public libraries).  The practice of keeping subversive books locked 
away faded after the Cold War ended and people were less afraid of subversive ideas. Id. 
 65. See Feuer, supra note 1 (“‘I’ve always led with the rhetoric that information should 
be free,’ he said, ‘but there was also an attitude of rote defiance, an allergy to authority, that I 
think is authentically American.’” (quoting Cody Wilson)). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 922(p) (2012). 
 67. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.92. 
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 922(p) (2012) (making it illegal to “manufacture, import, sell, ship, 
deliver, possess, transfer, or receive any firearm” that is undetectable by metal detectors). 
 69. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.92. 
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For undetectable weapons, which are assembled by the user from printed 
pieces, the printer could be configured to refuse to print these items unless, 
at a certain point in the process, a piece of metal is embedded in a critical 
piece of the design.  This limitation of the production of an integral part of 
the gun mimics modern printers’ inability to copy currency.  The firmware 
in modern copying machines and scanners in the United States and other 
nations has been configured to reject a certain pattern found on currency.  As 
a result of this firmware, many copiers cannot read and copy bills.70  
Certainly, these configurations can be hacked71 but that would present a far 
greater hurdle than finding a firearm CAD file online.  It also presents no free 
speech issues.  Additionally, this firmware solution could be altered 
depending on which country the printer is going to and could be regulated 
through customs.  The manufacturing company could be required to 
guarantee the printers’ firmware under ITAR and liability would result if the 
firmware were inconsistent with a nation’s gun laws. 
To counter the problem of the undetectable manufacture and sale of lower 
receivers without serial numbers, companies could create firmware that 
requires personal identification to use the device when lower receiver shapes 
are detected for printing.  This solution mimics the regulatory regime that 
governs pseudoephedrine, wherein purchasers are required to provide 
identification to the store to ensure they have not purchased more than a 
specific amount of the drug.72  Here, the printer companies would be 
responsible for maintaining the records, which would be available to law 
enforcement where proper channels are used.  Requiring users to upload a 
photo taken by the computer or device and uploading a matching 
identification card to the 3D printer online portal would create another step 
in printing that would result in either proper identification or identity theft.  
This liability scheme would act as a further deterrent to the average person.  
Finally, manufacturers could impose numeric limits on the number of lower 
receivers producible within a certain time frame.  Since, fundamentally, these 
regulations would be aimed at printer manufacturers and not at speech, there 
would likely be no First Amendment concerns or political wavering in 
enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
This two-pronged solution focuses on 3D printer manufacturers as a 
control point for the production of undetectable guns, and for monitoring 
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illegal gun manufacturing.  This solution avoids free speech issues, enables 
gun control to the extent that the legislature has already come to a consensus, 
and gives the U.S. government control over the capabilities of 3D printers 
coming into and leaving the country.  This solution also avoids the 
controversial application of ITAR to CAD files and the damage any ruling 
against long standing free speech principles could do to the credibility of 
government control; because the information will be free, but on whose 
terms? 
 
